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Insight often strikes us blind; when we aren’t expecting it, we suddenly see a
connection that previously eluded us—a kind of ‘Aha!’ experience. People with
a propensity to such experiences are regarded as insightful, and insightfulness
is a paradigmatic intellectual virtue. What’s not clear, however, is just what
it is in virtue of which being such that these experiences tend to happen to
one renders one intellectually virtuous. This paper draws from both virtue
epistemology as well as empirical work on the psychology of problem solving
and creativity to make some inroads in accounting for insightfulness as an
intellectual virtue. Important to the view advanced is that virtuously insightful
individuals manifest certain skills which both cultivate insight experiences
(even if not by directly bringing them about) and enable such individuals to
move in an epistemically responsible way from insight experience to epistemic
endorsement.
1. Insight and insightfulness
On 3 July 2012, Yitang Zhang, a 50-year maths lecturer, was taking a
stroll in the backyard of a friend’s house in Colorado before leaving for
a concert. He had been working tirelessly for years on one of the most
elusive problems in pure mathematics, the twin prime conjecture, one
of the ‘holy grails’ of pure mathematics. The twin prime conjecture says
that there are infinitely many primes numbers, p, such that p + 2 is also a
prime number—i.e., such as (3, 5), (5, 7), etc. Leading experts in analytic
number theory have been attempting to prove this since the middle of
the 19th century, but with no success. In fact, by 2012, no one had even
proven that there is any number such that there are an infinite number of
primes which differ by only that number (this later conjecture is called the
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bounded gaps conjecture). And what’s more is that no one had any obvious
leads as to how to make headway, though it was clear to all that if anyone
could provide a proof for the bounded gaps conjecture, this would be an
enormous breakthrough towards proving the twin prime conjecture.
When Zhang was taking that walk in his friend’s backyard in the summer
of 2012, he had made, to that point, no substantial contribution to math-
ematics and was virtually unknown by experts working in the field. He’d
not even published a paper since 2001, and had for a long time struggled
to find any academic employment. But, as Zhang later told a reporter, that
evening in July 2012 a solution to the bounded gaps conjecture suddenly
came to him, and ‘I immediately realized that it would work.’ He wrote
up the proof and sent it to the most prestigious journal in the field, Annals
of Mathematics1 and the publication of his proof left the experts shocked;
it was praised as one of the greatest and most surprising breakthroughs
in number theory, described as ‘astounding’ by number theorist Daniel
Goldson in an interview with Quanta magazine, and further as ‘one of
those problems you weren’t sure people would ever be able to solve2.’
So what exactly ‘happened’ to Yitang Zhang in his friend’s back yard? And
why did it happen to him? Let’s begin with the ‘what’ and then move to
the ‘why’. One mundane way to describe the situation is that what Zhang
did was to form a belief—viz., a belief about the bounded gaps conjecture—
which was both true and important. While this description is literally
accurate, it fails (rather badly) to capture an important epistemic dimension
of Zhang’s moment of clarity. After all, like most mathematicians working
in number theory, Zhang already believed the conjecture was true—he
believed this years before his discovery. Most number theorists believed it
as well.
In an interview with the New Yorker following the publication of his proof,
Zhang spoke more of the remarkable experience he had that evening. He
admitted that he wasn’t consciously trying to solve the bounded gap conjec-
ture at the moment the solution struck him. Rather, what he was actually
doing in his friend’s back yard was smoking a cigarette and watching for
deer, hoping he might spot one in the woods past a fence, and then he
suddenly realised there was a way to prove the bounded gaps conjecture.
He said in that interview, of the experience he had: ‘it’s hard to say what it
is . . . Something very special . . . I knew [immediately] that, even though
1See Zhang (2014) for the published proof.
2https://www.quantamagazine.org/20130519-unheralded-mathematician-bridges-
the-prime-gap/
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there were many details to fill in, we should have a proof. Then I went back
to the house3.’
There is plenty to say about Zhang’s epistemic achievement, though let’s
focus on what took place on 3 July. While Zhang worked remarkably hard
in the years leading up to his discovery, we can imagine others working sim-
ilarly hard, but who—after staring at the deer in the yard—(or, after staring
at whatever the leading number theorists were staring at that evening) were
struck by no thought of any importance. Zhang in that circumstance surely
had a remarkable insight. But what is an insight?
First, a disambiguation. Consider a parallel to assertion. In one sense, an
assertion is a speech act; in another sense, an assertion is what is issued
by the speech act of asserting. As assertion admits of a speech act/object
distinction4, likewise, insight admits of a cognitive act/object distinction.
In its most general and abstract sense, an act or episode of insight is a token
episode in which one grasps of something X, its relatedness to something
else, F, where F can be another object, property, etc. Call this, for short,
grasping under a relational mode. Insight, in the second (object) sense, is
what such a cognitive episode issues, the deliverance of an act of grasping
of something its relatedness to something else5.
Working with this very generic account of an episode of insight (which I’ll
continue to refine), we might expect that what such an episode issues—
insight in the object sense—is best understood as a true belief that (for
instance) some X is F. In Zhang’s case, this would translate to: believing not
simply that the bounded gaps conjecture is correct (something he already
believed), but rather believing that a certain proof for the bounded gaps
conjecture is correct. But this cannot be entirely right, either.
To appreciate why, consider a helpful example from Stephen Grimm (2012),
involving grasping, of a necessary truth, its necessity, in a way that is
required to know the necessary truth a priori. As Grimm observes, I might
believe on someone’s (say, a school teacher’s) testimony that a certain truth
is a necessary truth. Provided I lack any defeaters, I thus plausibly know on
your say so that something is a necessary truth, and yet, as Grimm (2012)
3http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/02/pursuit-beauty
4For a helpful recent discussion of this distinction, see MacFarlane (2014).
5One might wonder whether this simple account rules out anything like an ‘atomic’ or
non-relational insight—viz., just an insight that p. The answer, in short, is yes. But this is
a benefit of the account. A mere belief of something, that it is so, doesn’t entail an insight
(in the object sense) on the view I’m proposing, even though one’s grasping something
under a relational mode can entail that one believes of something that it is so. See the
ensuing discussion of Grimm (2010) and Schaffer (2001) for some reasons why.
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writes, it’s possible ‘even though I now have knowledge of a necessary truth,
I nonetheless fail to see or grasp or in some way appreciate its necessity6.’
If that’s the case, I fail to know the necessary truth a priori. In order to
do that I need to grasp, of the proposition, its necessity7. Compare now
with insight: just as knowing a priori that something is a necessary truth
involves a grasping of the proposition its necessity, similarly, grasping
of something, its relatedness to something else, isn’t going to be secured
simply by having a belief that something is related to something else in a
particular way. Such a belief can be acquired (e.g., testimonially) without
the kind of grasping that’s essential to insight8.
Here is a further very general point about insight: though Zhang’s insight
was profound, important, original, etc., insights as such, needn’t be. Often
times, I might have an entirely typical episode of insight when simply rul-
ing out a relevant alternative under unremarkable circumstances. Consider,
as Jonathan Schaffer (2001) has argued, that in order to properly count as
ruling out a relevant alternative (i.e., whether the milk in the fridge has
been consumed) in an epistemically satisfactory way, I must not merely
believe or even know of the relevant alternative that it is false9. I must do
something further: I must come to regard it as false while also appreciating
the alternative as relevant, and without this appreciation, the alternative
remains live even if my belief that the relevant alternative is false persists.
Let’s move now from insight to insightfulness. Individuals can be more
or less insightful. When they are, this will surely have something to do
with their dispositions to insightful episodes (episodes with the features
described), the episodes which issue insights. But here some care is needed.
Insightfulness, at least as a term of epistemic praise—viz., as an intellectual
virtue—isn’t simply a matter of having many insights.
After all, we aren’t likely to regard an individual as especially insightful if
her cognitive history includes an well-above average number of insights
(relative to the mean) provided the insights themselves are ones which
6My italics.
7Compare here with Jonathan Schaffer’s (2001) suggestion that in order to rule out a
relevant alternative, you need to not merely believe of some relevant alternative that it is
false, but you must further grasp it as false as an relevant alternative.
8See Pritchard (2009) for a related point regarding understanding-why.
9For some seminal discussions of relevant alternatives in epistemology, see Dretske
(1970) and Lewis (1996). For a more sophisticated contemporary version of this kind of
view, see Pritchard (2010).
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are on the whole utterly ‘shrugworthy10’: unimportant, superficial and/or
which fail to point beyond mundane ‘common knowledge’11.
I want to suggest now four dimensions along which an individual can
be plausibly evaluated as more insightful, with references to features of
that individual’s insights conceived as the deliverances of the individual’s
grasping under a relational mode12. These four dimensions involve depth,
non-triviality, originality, and frequency. These points won’t be uncontrover-
sial, so I want to briefly defend them before moving on to connect insight
with intellectual virtue in more sophistication and, ultimately, with feeling.
Firstly, depth. An insight is deep to the extent that what is grasped under
a relational mode is (in the context of discovery) unexpectedly so related,
viz., as when two areas of physics are brought together in a surprising
way13. A paradigmatic example here is James Maxwell Clerk’s late 19th
century discovery of electromagnetic force, when previously electricity and
magnetism were regarded to be two entirely separate kinds of force. Leon-
10Thanks to Mark Alfano for suggesting this term. Note that the converse of shrugworthy
is interesting, though the matter of what is interesting is itself a substantive question. For
some notable discussion on this point, see Hidi and Baird (1986) and Stace (1944).
11Of course, some insights are important in a domain even if not important outside of
that domain. Here we can imagine an individual, perhaps with Asperger’s Syndrome,
whose cognitive interest and inspiration are piqued only in the case of discussing bridges.
A lack of interest might undercut this individual’s inclination to be insightful outside
of the context of discussing bridges. But, this inclination is not undercut in the case of
discussing bridges. In cases like this, we might say that the individual is insightful in a
very domain-specific way. Thanks to Emma C. Gordon for discussion on this point.
12Note that these four dimensions along which an individual can plausibly be evaluated
as more insightful are not meant to be necessary and sufficient conditions for virtuous
insightfulness. More weakly, they are just dimensions along which propensities to insight
episodes can be plausibly evaluated as more or less good, from an epistemic point of
view. The noting of these dimensions is compatible with granting that some virtuously
insightful individuals might do better along some dimensions than others.
13I’m using ‘unexpectedness’ as an intuitive way, though I don’t think a detailed ac-
count of this (as it bears on the dimension of depth) will be promising. For example, a
subjective account of unexpectedness seems to make insights too easy to come by; obvious
connections will be unexpected for someone who is especially narrow-minded or poor
at appreciating connections. By contrast, an objective account of unexpectedness will
likely be too restrictive. For example, take Itô’s lemma (also referred to as the Itô–Doeblin
theorem), which was proved by Noboru Itô in 1944. However, it was later discovered
that Wolfgang Doeblin proved the same lemma four years earlier, in 1940, but sealed his
results in an envelope which was not opened until 2000. Had it turned out that Doeblin’s
results were established when he proved the lemma in 1940 (rather than sealed away in
an envelope), the lemma’s proof would (four years later) perhaps be unsurprising in the
mathematical community when Doeblin proved it, and Doeblin’s drawing the connections
he did would not longer be ‘unexpected’ (objectively) but expected.
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hard Euler’s famous identity, eipi + 1 = 0, which connects five fundamental
mathematical constants, is also a classic example of a deep insight, and
one that is often referred to as a paragon of mathematical beauty14. We are
inclined to regard an individual as more insightful, the deeper her insights.
Another dimension relevant to insightfulness is non-triviality. Even deep
insights can be trivial. Take, for example, spurious correlations. One who
reads papers daily might suddenly grasp that there is an utterly unexpected
strong correlation (over 95% from 1999-2009) between railway train death
collisions and barrels of US crude oil imports from Norway15, a relationship
previously unappreciated. Like Maxwell’s discovery of electromagnetic
force, one’s discovery of this spurious correlation has the trappings of depth.
Surely though an individual whose insights are nearly exclusively about
spurious correlations16 (or about unexpected relationships between various
patterns of blades of grass) will not be regarded as equally insightful as
another individual whose insights are equally deep but also important, or
meaningful17.
Thirdly, and probably most controversially, originality matters; specifically,
the originality of the deliverances of one’s episodes of insight is a dimension
that—at least, if our patterns of attributing insightfulness are a guide—
relevant to the insightfulness of the individual. If (as a contingent matter
of fact) many other individuals have had the same insights as you, this
seems to negatively affect our willingness to attribute insightfulness. A
corollary of this point is that at least one feature (originality) relevant to our
14For a discussion of the connection between deep insight and mathematical beauty, see
Rota (1997).
15The source for this data is the US Department of Energy and Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention.
16One might be inclined to think that grasping spurious correlations would give rise
to merely ‘spurious’ (i.e., not genuine) as opposed to genuine but trivial, insight. I think,
however, that we must distinguish between two kinds of correlations which fall under
the banner of ‘spurious correlations’, one kind of which gives rise to trivial albeit genuine
insights, another which gives rise to spurious or non-genuine insights. In the former case,
a correlation is in fact present, and the subject has successfully identified the relevant
pattern which happens to be a pattern that lacks any deep explanation—viz., a coincidental
correlation. Compare the grasping of such a coincidental correlation with a different case
in which one mistakenly regards oneself as having identified a correlation or pattern when
no such pattern is present. The latter is a spurious or non-genuine insight; no actual
pattern has been grasped or appreciated; the former case, a trivial albeit genuine insight.
Thanks to an anonymous referee at Episteme for raising this point.
17It’s doubtful that triviality has an absolute measure, independent of interests. The
example I’ve given above of a spurious correlation is one which that takes for granted
actual interests.
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judgments of insightfulness is relative; it is a dimension of insightfulness
which doesn’t have an absolute measure18.
Fourthly, frequency. An individual who has many episodes of insight is
(defeasibly) more insightful than one with fewer. This claim is compatible
with an assessment that an individual A who, has very few insights, is
comparatively more insightful than another, B, who has more, provided A’s
insights are evaluated more highly than B’s on the other three dimensions.
The point about frequency is just that, all else equal, more insights make
one more insightful—in the mundane sense that more generous acts makes
one more generous.
2. What makes insightfulness an intellectual virtue? A di-
lemma
The previous section articulated several key marks of insightfulness, as
a function of the kinds of insights issued by an individual’s episodes of
insight. This section explores what makes insightfulness, as a character
trait, an intellectual virtue, and in doing so, raises a kind of dilemma.
One very natural approach to vindicating insightfulness as an intellectual
virtue will be to follow virtue responsibilism and offer a motivationalist
account of insightfulness as an intellectual virtue (e.g., Battaly 2008; Mont-
marquet 1993)19. On this account, insightfulness is an intellectual virtue
not because of the epistemic value of the insights issued by insightful
people, but because of the epistemic value of the characteristic motivation
of insightful people. Compare here with openmindendeness: Heather
Battaly remarks: ‘What makes open-mindedness, so construed, an intel-
lectual virtue? What makes it an intellectual, rather than a moral, virtue
is its motivational component. Even though it need not track the truth, it is
18One reason this line will be controversial is that it, in a certain way, might seem unfair.
To appreciate this point, consider an example: suppose you’ve got 50 individuals on desert
islands, and each generates at the same time, the same deep insight. My suggestion is
that we are inclined to regard each as insightful to a less extent than we would were the
local circumstance different, and each individual’s insight were original. Again, though,
this point is meant to be an artefact of our normal patterns of attributing insightfulness,
which are perhaps not fair (in the sense that it is, along at least one dimension, outside of
one’s control whether that individual is likely to be regarded as insightful in one’s social
community).
19For an alternative kind of motivationalist account, framed in terms of personal worth,
see Baehr (2011).
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characterized by a motivation for truth20.’
Even if motivationalist accounts are plausible in the case of some intel-
lectual character virtues, in the case of insight, however, motivationalist
accounts seem to get the wrong result across a range of cases where insight-
fulness appears to be intellectually virtuous in the presence of intellectually
vicious motivation21. To appreciate this point, just imagine two versions of
a case, both of which the agent in question has little care for the truth, for
responsible inquiry, lacks curiosity, is intellectually dishonest, etc. Now, in
the first version of this case, suppose that over the course of a lifetime, this
individual fails to generate any original insights, whereas, in the second
version of the case, the individual (holding fixed the vicious motivations)
has a range of insights which are original, deep, etc. Two key points: firstly,
intuitively, despite whatever vices the individual in the second case has, she
also appears to possess one kind of intellectual virtue which the agent in
the former case lacks22. Even more, it’s hard to see how the agent in the
second case’s vicious motivation actual detracts in any from the epistemic
goodness of her insightfulness. If this is right, though, then to the extent
that insightfulness is an intellectual virtue, this isn’t going to be accounted
20See however Carter & Gordon (2014) for some criticism of both virtue responsibilist
and reliabilist attempts to account for openmindedness as a virtue in terms of a connection
with truth.
21A further potential problem for a responsibilist vindication of insightfulness as an
intellectual virtue is that episodes of insight do not seem to be cognitive performances,
even under a wide reading, which the agent is responsible for bringing about; rather, they
happen to one (often, when one is thinking of something else entirely, i.e., see Segal (2004)
on incubation).
22A virtue responsibilist might be inclined to insist that the above example confuses
intellectual virtue with a mere knack, skill or gift. The individual who despite lacking a
motivation for truth reliably generates deep insights clearly has a kind of skill or gift—viz.,
perhaps a fine-grained skill that permits this individual to spot connections or patterns
with ease, which in turn facilitates the kind of grasping that is characteristic of insight.
However, this concession is compatible with ascribing to such an individual the quality
of insightfulness despite the underlying lack of interest in the truth. The responsibilist
who wishes to maintain that the case in question features mere skill would presumably
require a story for how possessing the right motivations would raise the skill to the level of
virtue in other circumstances. The responsibilist could well have such a story, though the
intuition this case pair is meant to elicit is that such a story wouldn’t be a straightforward
one; at least, the example is meant to reveal a peculiarity about insight, in so far as it
cannot be accounted for within a responsibilist model as elegantly as other kinds of
character virtues. Thanks to an anonymous referee at Episteme for requesting clarification
on this point.
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for from within the motivationalist model23.
A rival paradigm for accounting for what makes a trait an intellectual virtue
is virtue reliabilism (Greco 1999; 2003; 2010a; 2012; Sosa 1991; 2009; 2011),
according to which what accounts for why a given trait is an intellectual
virtue is its propensity to deliver true beliefs and avoid error. On this
model, to the extent that insightfulness is an intellectual virtue, it will be
in virtue of insightfulness’s reliability in issuing true beliefs.
This view also quickly runs into a jam. Take as a starting point Mark
Alfano’s (2012, 246) remark that ‘If someone has an original insight even
once a week, that might qualify her as insightful’. This seems about right.
Consider Elon Musk, who has invented PayPal, Tesla Motors, SpaceX,
and holds many patents. Musk might very well have an original insight
per week, and even if he has several ‘false positives’ which he scraps each
week24, this intuitively doesn’t seem to undermine our willingness to regard
him as (very) insightful nonetheless. Put another way: on the supposition
that Musk has an original insight each week, that very plausibly suffices for
his being virtuously insightful, the point intimated by Alfano’s observation;
we needn’t (for instance) inquire further about his track record. This latter
point is however at tension with the virtue reliabilist account of what makes
a trait an intellectual virtue; the virtue reliabilist fails to account for why
insightfulness, qua intellectual virtue, shouldn’t be approached through
the lens of a batting average.
3. Insight problem solving, feeling and virtue
A tempting knee-jerk conclusion to draw is that if insightfulness can’t
be accounted for as an intellectual virtue on either a motivationalist or
reliabilist model—that is, with reference to characteristic motivation or
propensity to issue true beliefs—then it’s simply not a bona fide intellectual
23As Mark Alfano has pointed out to me, a similar point cam be made with reference to
what Nietzsche called ‘abysmal insights’, insights which Nietzsche regarded as painful
and unwanted, into to the depths of the pettiness and contemptibility of the human soul.
24False positives could involve cases where one merely thinks that one has grasped some
connection under a relational mode but in fact has not done so. For example, I might have
an ‘insight’ to the effect that a particular suspect is guilty, when the suspect is innocent.
Or, even if the suspect really is guilty, I might merely think I’ve grasped this, when actually
my regarding the suspect as guilty is the result of an undetected bias. Note that on some
non-factive views of insight, these ‘false positives’ count as genuine insights, provided
they aid to render my world more intelligible. This is a view that has been advanced by
Wayne Riggs (2004).
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virtue. This would be far too quick. In this section and the next, I want
to show how insightfulness can be vindicated as an intellectual virtue,
in a way that draws from both virtue epistemology as well as empirical
psychology.
To this end, it will be helpful to begin by reviewing some empirical work
on insight problem solving in psychology. Consider the following classic
insight problem: the ‘nine-dot problem’ (e.g., Chronicle, Ormerod, and
MacGregor 2001; Kershaw and Ohlsson 2004), according to which one is
instructed to connect all nine of the dots below, using just four straight
lines, but without lifting one’s pencil/pen from the paper. (Try this, though
don’t look yet at the solution below25).
Figure 1: The nine-dot problem
There is a certain phenomenology common to the discovery of solutions
to insight tasks such as the one above (e.g., Sternberg and Davidson 1995;
Metcalfe and Wiebe 1987). For instance, once the participant realises that
the lines can go beyond the square that is formed by the nine dots, there is
with this (and the discovery of other insight problem solutions) a kind of
‘aha’ experience.
Figure 2: Solution
One aspect distinctive of episodes of insight is that the ‘aha’ experience
25While apprehending a solution to the nine-dot problem is not something we’d regard
as a deep or especially interesting insight, it is on my view at least an insight nonetheless,
and so of the sort the psychological structure of which is instructive (as insight problems
of this sort have been well studied).
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is not gradual, but sudden. For instance, in a study by Janet Metcalfe
and David Wiebe (1987), participants completed classic insight problems
along with ‘non-insight’ problems (i.e., such as problems where one must
simply apply an algebra rule). In each case, participants recorded ‘patterns-
of-warmth’ ratings, which reflect the subjects’ feelings of approaching
a solution. Patterns-of-warmth ratings differed significantly in the case
of insight versus non-insight tasks. As they found ‘Algebra problems
and noninsight problems showed a more incremental pattern over the
course of solving than did insight problems . . . the phenomenology of
insight-problem solution was characterized by a sudden, unforeseen flash
of illumination’26.
Secondly, a key feature of the psychology of insight is termed incubation,
where a break in attention to the task at hand can effectively facilitate the
solution process (e.g., Dodds, Ward, and Smith 2003; Hélie and Sun 2010),
though the mechanisms by which this occurs are debated27. In a study
by Eliaz Segal (2004), insight tasks were completed more effectively by
individuals who took a break after reaching a self-reported ‘impasse’ than
did those who did not.
Thirdly, there is some neuroscientific evidence that the kind of ‘aha’ experi-
ences associated with participants attaining solutions to insight tasks cor-
respond with different neural states in the case of insight versus non-insight
tasks. As Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) note, the right anterior temporal area
is associated with making connections across distantly related information
during comprehension; and, further, FMRIs in their 2004 study revealed
‘increased neural activity in the right hemisphere anterior superior tem-
poral gyrus in the case of individuals gaining solutions to insight relative
to noninsight tasks’ (Jung-Beeman et al. 2004).
These empirical features of insight solutions, as reported in cases of classic
insight problems in psychology, suggest a picture on which (i) episodes of
insight are typically (ii) preceded by incubation; (iii) are characterised by a
distinctive phenomenology (i.e., feelings of approaching an answer which
differ from non-insight cases) and neurophysiology (relative to non-insight
solutions); and that the distinctive phenomenology or ‘aha’ experience is
both (iv) sudden and (v) unforeseen.
Note firstly, that this picture aligns well with the account offered by Yit-
26(Metcalfe and Wiebe 1987, 238).
27As Segal (2004) has proposed, the mechanism function of the incubation period is
best understood as simply diverting the solver’s releasing her mind from the grip of a
false organizing assumption.
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ang Zhang of his own experience. Zhang’s incubation period (when his
attention was diverted from the bounded gaps conjecture and focused on
the deer in the yard) was suddenly interrupted by a realisation that he
described as ‘immediate’ and ‘something special’.
I want to now (perhaps unsurprisingly) suggest that a satisfactory account
of what makes insightfulness an intellectual virtue should make some
essential reference to how is that what is distinctive of episodes of insight—
i.e., namely, the kinds of ‘eureka28’ moments which typically are preceded
by incubation—are connected in some way to our epistemic ends or goals.
But, in order to make this argument, however, I shall present an objection
to the strategy just outlined; the account of insightfulness as a virtue I want
to defend emerges as a response to the anticipated objection.
The objection to accounting for what makes insightfulness an intellectual
virtue, in terms of how the psychology of insight is connected to some
epistemic end (i.e., truth) is that such an account will face what we can call
(for lack of a better term) the ‘bunny problem’. Consider that rabbits’ hare-
trigger instinct to flee from danger—an instinct which often saves their
lives when predators are near—is nonetheless very unreliable at detecting
danger, even when working normally in an environment suited to its
function29. Their ‘danger’ detectors generate mostly (around 90%) false
positives, which is why when a bunny’s ‘sense of danger’ is triggered, this is
nearly always in the absence of genuine danger. Of course, having an over-
primed disposition to flee is evolutionarily advantageous for bunnies, and
this is so even though the sense of danger detector is woefully unreliable at
distinguishing genuine danger from ‘false’ danger30. In short, the bunny’s
sense of danger doesn’t discriminate danger from non-danger.
Unfortunately for us, though, the key psychological features associated
with insight are triggered in cases of correct insights (i.e., where one’s
grasping under a relational mode is apt, and generates some epistemically
valuable ‘cognitive contact with reality’) but also in cases of incorrect in-
sights (i.e., where one sees an unexpected connection, rendering a body
of information or task intelligible, but which is not accurate), as when
28I am, in this paper, using ‘Aha’ and ‘eureka’ experiences interchangeably, which
is following precedent in this literature. I do this with some reservation, though, as
‘eureka’ seems to capture experiences that belong to a narrow class of insights with special
practical importance to the agent, whereas ‘Aha’ seems germane to a broader class of
insight experiences.
29I borrow this example from Peter J. Graham.
30Compare with D. Kelly’s (2011) remarks about the untrustworthiness of feelings of
disgust, given the propensity of such feelings to issue false positives.
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we pre-emptively celebrate an ‘insight’ (i.e., ‘Aha, it’s the butler. . . wait,
nevermind’31.) This is why, as Stephen Grimm (2010) notes, from the
inside, genuine (factive) understanding feels indistinguishable from what
he calls subjective understanding which is merely a grasp of how specific
propositions interlink, and which does not depend on their truth but rather
on their forming a coherent or intelligible picture32. Coherent pictures of
course, can depart dramatically with how things actually stand and thus
be of scant epistemic value.
4. Insightfulness as a virtue, redux
Compare Yitang Zhang with British Mathematician Andrew Wiles, who
believed, in 1993, that he’d proven Fermat’s Last Theorem, which states
that no positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation an + bn = cn for
any integer n such that n > 2. This is harder than it looks33; no one had
proven it in the more than 350 years since it was first proposed, though
many had tried.
Wiles’ announcement in 1993 followed an insight he described as ‘beau-
tiful . . . I was electrified. I knew that moment the course of my life was
changing34’. But Wiles had overlooked a gap in his proof. After his series
of lectures in Cambridge, he began receiving e-mails from a reviewer, Prin-
ceton’s Nick Katz, with questions about the details of the proof. Most of
31There might be different kinds of botched insights, some more epistemically valuable
than others. The kind of botched insight I’m interested in (as illustrated by the examples
I use), by contrast with paradigmatic apt insights, are ones in which the agent, suitably
informed, appreciates the error from within her epistemic framework. Wiles, for instance,
working from within his own understanding of mathematics, made a mistake he could
himself later appreciate. Compare this however with a very different sort of botched
grasping, one that we might be inclined to regard as epistemically defective, but which the
agent herself would not, from within the standards of evaluation of her own framework.
For instance, compare the defectiveness of Ptolemy’s insights, in the Amalgest. They served
the aim of rendering Ptolemy’s world picture intelligible (even if not accurate), and were
not defective from within his own model. There is a sense in which Wiles’ grasping (from
1993, not 1994) is thus botched in a different way than was Ptolemy’s. For those who are
inclined to release a grip on metaepistemological absolutism (e.g. Boghossian (2006)), it
will look as though the latter kind of ‘botched’ grasping is not botched as all, even if the
former is. Thanks to Modesto Gómez Alonso for stimulating discussion on this point.
32For discussion on this point, see Gordon (2016).
33The proof, which Wiles eventually correctly put forward in 1995, was so complicated,
and drew from so many different areas of mathematics, that only a few mathematicians
were capable of verifying it at the time. See Singh (1997) for an overview.
34https://plus.maths.org/content/fermats-last-theorem-and-andrew-wiles
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Katz’s questions, Wiles could answer, but one of the questions revealed
what he appreciated as a serious problem35. By 1994, Wiles was on the
brink of giving up, when he was finally able to patch the gap, and prove
Fermat’s Last Theorem successfully, in 1995.
Wiles’ remarkable felt experience in 1993, which he took to be beautiful,
was in an important respect defective, a kind of botched grasping (even if a
highly skilled botched grasping)36. In order to give a plausible an account
of what makes insightfulness an intellectual virtue in terms of how the
psychological features of insight are connected to some epistemic end (i.e.,
truth, understanding, etc.) it is necessary to discriminate between the kinds
of ‘eureka’ feelings which typically follow incubation in cases of correct
insight (i.e., Zhang’s in 2012 and Wiles’ in 1994) from the subjectively
indistinguishable ‘eureka’ feelings which follow incubation in cases of
mistaken insights (i.e. Wiles in 1993).
I want to now suggest how such an account of insightfulness as an intel-
lectual virtue might do exactly this. The model I want to suggest connects
virtue and feeling in two different directions: from preparation and in-
cubation to feeling, and from feeling to judgment or verification. The
model I suggest draws from the basic ‘four stage’ model of creative prob-
lem solving as originally introduced in Graham Wallas’ (1926) seminal
text in the philosophy of creativity The Art of Thought. On Wallas’ view,
the feeling of illumination is (in the case of creative problem solving) best
appreciated as the third step in a four-step creative process anteceded by
(i) preparation and (ii) incubation and followed by what Wallas calls (iv)
verification. What I want to suggest, in a nutshell (which I will flesh out), is
that the virtuously insightful individual is skilled at bringing about (even if
not directly or intentionally) ‘eureka’/illumination experiences specifically
by excelling in the anteceding stages of preparation and incubation, and
further, is skilled in a very specific way which I’ll explain, at moving from
these felt experiences to judgment or verification, where the aim of the
final stage is truth (or more broadly, understanding). For ease of reference,
call the first stage the cultivation stage of virtuous insight and the second the
35The problem was a very subtle and technical one. According to biographer Singh
(1997, 405-06), Wiles described the magnitude of the problem as follows: ‘It was an
error in a crucial part of the argument involving the Kolyvagin–Flach method, but it was
something so subtle that I’d missed it completely until that point. The error is so abstract
that it can’t really be described in simple terms. Even explaining it to a mathematician
would require the mathematician to spend two or three months studying that part of the
manuscript in great detail’.
36Of course, Wiles’ grasping was not without some epistemic value. See fn. 31 for
discussion of varieties of botched grasping.
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management stage of virtuous insight.
4.1. Cultivation stage of virtuous insight
An initial worry is that despite what Zhang did in the previous stages, it
was a matter of fortune that he had the insight he did when staring at the
deer, thinking of something else entirely, and not even at that moment
trying to solve any problem. The underlying intuition here is that it was
in a straightforward sense out of his control that he had the illuminating
experience he did. And if it’s out of his control, then it can’t be explained
by any virtue of Zhang’s at the preparation and incubation stage, but rather,
by luck37. Or so this line of worry goes.
Here, an analogy from the literature on unreliable achievements will be
helpful. Consider, for example, artistic achievements. To borrow an example
I’ve advanced in previous work38, an artist for instance might produce her
signature pottery by using methods that very often produce cracked and
broken failures. In order to produce a new and successful work, she may,
in ordinary circumstances instance, have to make several attempts. ‘It may
be that ordinarily, her ways of making pottery are unsafe. Nevertheless,
we would not, for this reason, hesitate to say that her successful works are,
in many cases, artistic achievements’ and in doing so credit her success in
the main to her ability. A similar intuition holds in the case of athletic
achievements. As John Greco (2012) remarks:
[. . .] different abilities require different degrees of reliability.
Thus Kobe Bryant is a great free-throw shooter because he is
successful around 85% of the time. Jeter is a great hitter because
he is successful around 30% of the time (2012, 17).
37This line has two kinds of sources of support. Firstly, prior to John Greco’s (2012)
more recent articulation of virtue epistemology, Greco (2008; 2010b) offered a contrastive
account of the relationship between a success’s dependence on ability as opposed to luck.
In particular, Greco’s view was that if a success is not saliently explained by ability, then
it’s lucky. To the extent that we’re not inclined to regard instances of insight as saliently
explained by skill (given their being not subject to direct control) we might be led to
regard the success as lucky. Secondly, the above line receives direct support from what
is now a minority view in the philosophy of luck in epistemology, in particular, lack of
control accounts (Zimmerman 1987; Riggs 2009) according to which successes our lucky
provided they are relevantly out of the subject’s control. Cf., Pritchard (2005) for a detailed
discussion and an alternative modal model.
38See Carter, Jarvis & Rubin (2015).
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Even if the artist’s successful pot and Jeter’s hit are unsafe—viz., they don’t
occur in most nearby worlds where we hold fixed the initial conditions—we
nonetheless credit the success to the ability, even if it is not an ability to
intentionally bring about the outcome at will more often than not.
To the extent that the successful potter and Derek Jeter’s respective suc-
cesses are due to their abilities, it is because, in light of their dispositions,
they do much better than the mean in attaining success. For instance, it
is because of Jeter’s practice and form that he hits above the mean, even
though he can’t directly bring about it that he gets a hit. Likewise, I want
to suggest, even though it was beyond Zhang’s control to bring about his
being struck with the ‘eureka’ experience he had, his being so struck is in
an important respect creditable to his skills at the anteceding preparation
and incubation stages, and that this point holds more generally.
Firstly, regarding the incubation stage. While Browne and Cruse (1988)
have reported some effect of choosing relaxing (over other forms of) activity
during incubation, several other studies have suggested that activity choice
during incubation makes little difference (e.g., Dodds, Ward, and Smith
2003; Olton and Johnson 1976).
Preparation however is different. Skill at the preparation stage can, in one
obvious sense, come as a result of manifesting one’s other task-relevant
intellectual virtues, i.e., by being intellectually tenacious, intellectually
courageous, intellectually openminded, etc. in ways that bear on the prob-
lem task39. This should not be surprising, and is clearly the case in our
pet examples of Zhang, and also Wiles, each of whom worked tirelessly
39One might object that it is somehow illicit to advert to other intellectual virtues in the
service of explicating a different virtue. Perhaps, as this line of worry goes, doing so (in
order to explicate the cultivation stage of virtuous insightfulness) undermines the case
for thinking that insightfulness is a distinct virtue, but rather, that it simply ‘reduces’ in
some way to other more basic intellectual virtues. I think a useful analogy to consider,
in replying to this objection, is the famous Reid/Hume divide between anti-reductivists
and reductivists in the epistemology of testimony. Is testimony itself distinctive as an
epistemic source, or does it reduce to more basic sources? If the latter, then testimony is
simply different from memory, perception and other basic epistemic sources. I’m entirely
open to the thought that insightfulness be understood, as Humean reductivists think of
testimony, along the lines of a ‘derivative’ intellectual virtue, in so far as the explication
I’m offering for what makes an individual virtuously insightful makes needed recourse to
the exercise of other intellectual virtues. However, even embracing this kind of Humean
interpretation needn’t involve denying that insightfulness is an intellectual virtue at all.
In order to make that case, one must argue that it is criterial of any bona fide virtue that
it’s explication make reference to no other virtue. This would be a very strong criterion.
(After all, both Plato and Aristotle have in different ways regarded the virtues as unified).
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prior to their breakthroughs40. However, there are also more fine-grained
features at the preparation stage which generate a higher likelihood of
success relative to the mean. For example, results reported by Silveira
(1972) have shown a positive correlation between the timing of one’s in-
terruption in insight tasks. In Silveira’s experiment, she had experimental
participants work on a chain-link insight task, and the participants were
interrupted either 3 or 13 minutes after starting. Then, following a 30
incubation period, the subjects returned to the task to work, for either
32 or 22 minutes, whereas control subjects worked continuously for 35
minutes. Silveira found that whereas those interrupted 3 minutes in did
only slightly better than control subjects, those interrupted 13 minutes
in did significantly better than in the control case. As Dodd et al (2003,
7) noted, a conclusion to be drawn here is that ‘incubation effects may be
more apparent when the person solving the problem has had more time
to become fixated prior to taking a break from the problem’. Of course,
individuals can be better or worse at facilitating these conditions, and part
of what makes an individual perform better relative to the mean is her
resilience, focus and commitment to the task, traits an individual can be
responsible for cultivating.
Putting this all together: while the illuminating experience of being struck
with a ‘eureka’ moment is not typically brought about by deliberate direct
control—these are things which we say happen to one, seemingly out of the
blue—they are not a matter of luck, but rather, can be properly attributed
to an insightful individual’s virtues in light of how the insightful individual
performs better than the mean in the (to use Wallas’ model) preparation
and incubation stages anteceding the moment of insight41.
40For a detailed discussion on Wiles’ preparation, see Singh (1997).
41While properly managing these antecedent steps plausibly increases the propensity
to insight experiences, it might be that there are certain rare cases where little effort is
required at these antecedent stages. For example, the mathematical genius Srinivasa
Ramanujan had what Freeman Dyson called ‘some sort of magic tricks that we don?t
understand’—viz., a capacity to inexplicably intuit deep mathematical results, for example
concerning mock modular forms, without supplying proofs for these results. In the case
of Ramanujan’s insights about mock modular forms, several of these were later proven to
be accurate by mathematical tools that were not available in Ramanujan’s time. Such cases
are plausible outliers in which no further effort at the preparation and/or incubation stage
would increase the propensity of insight experience. Thanks to an anonymous referee at
Episteme for noting this case.
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4.2. Management stage of virtuous insight
§4.1 outlined how the virtuously insightful individual can, by excelling in
the anteceding stages of preparation and incubation, perform better than
the mean in generating the ‘eureka’ experience, despite such an experience
being out of the individual’s direct performative control.
But of course, as was noted at the end of §3, the ‘eureka’ experience is but
the third of four stages of the Wallas model of creative problem solving.
And, as I suggested the move from the third stage to the fourth stage—
i.e., judgment or endorsement—can be done more or less skilfully. Recall
again here, the ‘bunny problem’, where a rabbit’s ‘hare-trigger’ instinct is
needed to avoid danger, it is woefully unreliable; the hare-trigger response
to perceived threat is a poor predictor (approximately 10%) of danger.
And the point about the subjective indistinguishability between eureka
experiences which accompany accurate versus botched grasping reveal
a similar kind of problem of us: like the bunny, the feeling in cases of
botched grasping is indistinguishable from the feeling of apt grasping.
In this section, I want to propose an account of how the virtuously in-
sightful individual can be appreciated as skilled at moving from these felt
experiences that follow preparation and incubation to judgment or verific-
ation (i.e. the fourth stage), where the aim of this stage is truth (or more
broadly, understanding).
The first step here will be to consider more carefully the epistemic structure
of the connection between the third and fourth stages, that is between the
‘eureka’ feeling, and the ensuing judgment or endorsement of the content
issued by the grasping. Here, it will be helpful to draw from one established
and increasingly popular model within which this kind of transition can
be sharpened.
According to the perceptual model of emotional experience (e.g., Elgin 1999;
Prinz 2004; Roberts 1988; Johnston 2001) emotional experience constitutes
reason or evidence for evaluative judgement in a similar way to the way in
which perceptual experience constitutes reason or evidence for empirical
judgement42. One class of evaluative judgments are epistemic evaluations.
And so one way to think about the epistemic significance of the kinds of
‘eureka’ feelings associated with insight are, within this model, specifically,
as reasons or evidence for epistemic evaluations. On this view, the trans-
42This presentation of the perceptual model owes to Michael Brady (2013, 67) who
challenges the model and embraces instead a kind of ‘proxy’ evidence view of the epistemic
role of emotional experience.
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ition from stage three to four (i.e., from feeling to judgment) is a transition
from feeling as evidence for an epistemic evaluation—an endorsement—of
the insight.
Thinking about the transition from stage three to four within this model
makes evident the place for the virtuously insightful individual to exercise
skill. Just as, in the perceptual case, an individual can afford too much
or too little epistemic weight to one’s perceptions in forming empirical
judgments43, so likewise, an individual can afford too much or too little
epistemic weight to one’s emotional experiences (at the ‘eureka stage’) in
epistemically evaluating the insight. For example, the virtuously insightful
individual, upon having the ‘eureka’ experience, has fewer false negatives
relative to the mean, in that the virtuously insightful individual does not
ignore the kind of felt connections between information when these are
epistemically valuable (i.e., of the sort that are likely to lead to true belief
or understanding). Likewise, the virtuously insightful individual is appro-
priately cautious in moving from emotional experience to endorsement.
To give an example of the exercise of such caution, consider the follow-
ing case, where cognitive biases are at play. Take, for example, belief bias
(i.e., Klauer, Musch, and Naumer 2000) according to which individuals
tend to give disproportionate positive evaluations of the logical strength of
arguments the more believable their conclusions are judged to be. Many
insights are graspings which depend on appreciation of argument cogency;
naturally, one potential cause of botched grasping (i.e., a ‘eureka’ exper-
ience which does not generate apt insight) is belief bias. The virtuously
insightful individual is more attuned than most in her sensitivity to the
kinds of biases she might be aﬄicted with which could defeat the eviden-
tial weight of the ‘eureka’ experience. The virtuously insightful individual
accordingly is best understood as occupying a kind of Aristotelian mean
between affording too little or too much evidential weight to the kind of
felt experience at stage 3, in her transition from the insight to endorsement.
Put another way: the virtuously insightful individual is better than the
mean at issuing safe endorsements, conditioned upon her felt experiences
of insight.
43At one limit is the individual who ‘believes everything she sees’, and is as such
often deceived; at the other limit is the individual who deprives herself from perceptual
evidence gained by others by the vice of over-cautiousness.
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5. Concluding remarks
‘Aha’ experiences happen to some more than others—as if out of the blue—
but virtuously insightful individuals are better than others at cultivating
the right precursors to these episodes, and importantly, at moving in a
responsible way from these felt experiences to endorsed insights. In this
paper I hope to have shown how both the psychology of problem solving
as well as the resources of virtue epistemology, paired together, offer some
explanation for why this is so.44
44Thanks to Mark Alfano, Michel Croce, Modesto Gómez Alonso, Emma C. Gordon and
Kate Elgin for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. I am also grateful to
an anonymous referee and the Associate Editor at Episteme and an especially insightful
audience at the Cognitive Irrationality Project at the University of Basel, and in particular
to Anne Meylan, Melanie Sarzano and Marie van Loon for organising the event.
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